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Abstract 
The Tea Party proved to be a serious political force in the 2010 midterm elections. 
Although well-mobilized, the Tea Party remained a decentralized movement manifesting only a 
few general themes. Tea Party supporters in 2010 shared a negative view of the economy and the 
current conditions in Washington, disliked the Affordable Care Act, and wanted a smaller, more 
limited role for the government. Previous research has shown that the outcome of the 2010 
midterm elections was consistent with the theory of incumbent parties being voted out of office 
when the popular sentiment about the economy is negative. This project seeks to expand on that 
theory and identify common factors in districts electing freshman Tea Party members which may 
have led to greater mobilization and support for the movement, particularly economic factors. 
This will facilitate a better understanding of the factors directly influencing the voters who were 
the strongest supporters of the Tea Party, and attempt to identify some of the potential causes of 
the movement. 
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After the election of Barack Obama in 2008, a new Conservative movement under the 
name of the Tea Party emerged in American politics. What started out as a small, grassroots 
initiative quickly grew into a national force, with several Tea Party candidates emerging to pose 
challenges to incumbent Republicans and Democrats in competitive districts in the 2010 midterm 
elections. Republicans won a majority in the House of Representatives in 2010, often, it was 
assumed, because of the Tea Party movement, whether because of the actual votes the Tea Party 
was able to deliver, the enthusiasm it was able to conjure up for Conservative viewpoints, or 
merely its ability to capitalize on the preexisting dissatisfaction with politics in Washington. All-
in-all, 60 Republican Members of Congress elected to join the Tea Party Caucus in the House of 
Representatives after they took office in January of 2011 (Travis 2011). Although a minority, 
they exercised a disproportionate amount of control in significant policy battles—most notably 
the debt ceiling debates in the summer of 2011, often pushing the entire House Republican 
Caucus further to the right and into more uncompromising policy positions.  
 Much of the scholarship on the Tea Party has taken the form of examining the 2010 
election results and focusing on the makeup of the movement individually and structurally. Prior 
research has identified the demographics of Tea Party membership. Much of this has also been 
focused on the goals of the Tea Party-what it stands for, how it operates, and who is really 
behind it financially. Some of the scholarship then moves on to look at how the Tea Party 
influenced the 2010 midterm elections. Relatively little of the research looks at the policy 
positions of the Tea Party in Congress or why candidates sympathetic to the Tea Party movement 
did better in some districts than in others.  
Research on the Tea Party has noted several significant demographic characteristics of its 
supporters. Skocpol and Williamson (2012) note first and foremost that Tea Party supporters 
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represented a minority of the American public, “about one-fifth of voting-age adults, or roughly 
46 million Americans” (Skocpol and Williamson, 2012, p. 22). A CBS/New York Times poll 
released in April 2010 reported that roughly 75% were over the age of 45. Other polls have noted 
proportions slightly lower than this but still high enough to conclude that most Tea Party 
supporters are over 45 (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). They also are more likely to have 
supported Republican candidates. In the NYT/CBS poll, 18% of respondents said they “always” 
voted Republican while another 48% noted they “usually” voted Republican” (New York Times 
and CBS News, 2010, p. 35). They were also more likely than the general population to attend 
church services every week (38% of Tea Party respondents, 27% of other respondents) or almost 
every week (12% of Tea Party, 8% of population). The majority of Tea Party supporters were 
also Protestant and married (New York Times and CBS News 2010). Tea Party supporters were 
better-educated than the average voter with 33% noting they had “some college,” 23% being 
“college grads,” and 14% having post-graduate education (New York Times and CBS News, 
2010, p. 41). They are overwhelmingly white (89%), majority male (59%), and more located in 
higher income brackets (New York Times and CBS News 2010).        
The beginning of the Tea Party can be traced to Rick Santelli’s nationally-broadcast 
statement (Skocpol and Williamson 2012) focusing on the massive government bailouts and the 
increasing burden taxpayers were shouldering for those who were considered by many to have 
made irresponsible decisions. The movement picked up speed when Glenn Beck championed the 
cause on Fox News. As often happens with grassroots movements, the smaller local 
organizations had significant autonomy as to what their groups would do, allowing them to tailor 
interests to their constituencies. Although this structure lends itself to disparate interests, in 
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general, the Tea Party seemed to express distaste for government and a commitment to the 
Constitution (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). 
Skocpol and Williamson (2012) note that the Tea Party is fairly united in its opposition to 
the Affordable Care Act and support for a decreased government role in the economy (Skocpol 
and Williamson 2012). They are quick to point out that Tea Party disdain for government does 
not extend to all programs. Most notably, Tea Partiers support Medicare, Social Security, and 
disability payments. They have paid into these systems and expect to see their money back 
(Williamson, Skocpol and Coggin 2011). They relate these seemingly opposing views back to 
differences in “the perceived deservingness of recipients” and views on those who are versus 
those who are not working (Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin 2011, p. 33). Medicare and Social 
Security draw strong support from the Tea Party because those are systems they have invested in 
with their personal work earnings rather than being “government handouts” (Williamson, 
Skocpol, and Coggin 2011, p. 33). This extends to illegal immigrants, whom Tea Party 
supporters view negatively in general and as individuals who are receiving handouts one way or 
another. Many Tea Partiers also seemed to translate this into contempt for the younger 
generations with a sense that many in that category do not work as hard as they did (Williamson, 
Skocpol, and Coggin 2011). 
At times the Tea Party rhetoric seems to expose underlying currents of racial prejudice. 
Skocpol and Williamson (2012) cite that, “At least one scholarly study suggests that problematic 
racial assumptions are widely held by Tea Party supporters” (p. 69). Skocpol and Williamson 
point out that these views are centered on the idea that minorities are not as hardworking. This 
seems to be consistent with the anecdotal evidence Williamson, Skocpol, and Coggin (2011) 
provide for negative attitudes toward illegal immigrants. Institutionally, however, the Tea Party 
7 
 
has been very careful to minimize the image of being a group which is affiliated with racist 
views. They have been more outspoken, however, in their views on other groups. “…Fear and 
hatred of Islam and Muslims were commonly expressed” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, p. 69).      
 Although the Tea Party movement is fundamentally a grassroots movement that relies on 
citizens taking active, prominent roles on the local level, national organizations and funders have 
been influential in the movement. Skocpol and Williamson draw attention to the fact that 
national, Conservative organizations such as Freedom Works and Americans for Prosperity have 
been heavily involved in the movement. Media channels, particularly Fox News and affiliates 
such as Glenn Beck helped to spread the word about the grassroots happenings. Skocpol and 
Williamson (2012) have reported a certain amount of strain between the Republican 
establishment and the Tea Party grassroots. Michael Steele, the former Chairman of the 
Republican National Committee, was early on excluded from Tea Party events (Skocpol and 
Williamson 2012). This dynamic has been echoed by Ashbee (2011).  
 Fox News and Glenn Beck were particularly helpful in spreading the word about the 
growing Tea Party movement and adding fuel to the fire (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Glenn 
Beck’s “9/12 Project” fit in well with Tea Party views (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, p. 133-
134) and, “worked with Freedom Works and other Tea Party groups to co-sponsor the first 
unified national manifestation of Tea Party enthusiasm” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012, p. 134). 
Freedom Works and Americans for Prosperity, both proponents of more libertarian ideas, were 
likewise big supporters of the movement. But these groups had preexisting policy goals. In this 
respect, their alliance with the Tea Party gained them grassroots support for goals serving select 
special interests rather than populism (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).     
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 When Republicans won enough seats in the 2010 midterm elections to secure a majority 
in the House of Representatives many attributed this to the rise and support of the Tea Party. 
Studies have shown, however, that the results of these elections were highly predictable based on 
the usual factors such as the economy and the popularity of the President. Karpowitz, Monson, 
Patterson, and Pope (2011) found little correlation between Tea Party support as judged by 
endorsements, and those candidates who won their election. Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) 
similarly point to various other factors outside of Tea Party support that much more strongly 
corresponded with the results.  
 Karpowitz et al. examined the results of the 2010 midterm elections, specifically 
measuring the effect Tea Party endorsements had on the election. They find that the endorsement 
of Freedom Works was the only type of endorsement that was correlated in a significant way 
with an increase in the likelihood that a candidate would win in his or her district. Karpowitz, 
Monson, Patterson, and Pope (2011) note that this is a correlation only. They go on to explain 
that Freedom Works not only endorsed candidates but donated money, though a much smaller 
amount to each individual candidate (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011). Karpowitz 
et al. attribute this correlation to the fact that “Freedom Works was more strategic in its choice of 
candidates than some other Tea Party-affiliated groups” (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and 
Pope 2011, p. 306). Freedom Works generally endorsed candidates in districts in which they had 
more competitive races. In the primaries, they found that endorsements did raise Tea Party-
affiliated candidates’ percentage of the vote by 8-9% and signing the Contract From America (a 
document expressing specific Tea Party endorsed views) increased their percentage of the vote 
by around 20% (Karpowitz, Monson, Patterson, and Pope 2011). Overall, Karpowitz, Monson, 
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Patterson, and Pope (2011) conclude that Tea Party support had a relatively small effect on 
Republican victories in 2010. 
 Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) find that the Tea Party was not a determining factor 
in the midterm elections. The authors, “analyze House races in districts held by Democrats in the 
111th Congress” (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2012, p. 5). They then look at endorsements, the 
underlying partisan distribution in the district, “challenger quality” which was generally based on 
previous elected office experience, the amount a candidate spent on their election, and the 
incumbent’s vote on the Affordable Care Act (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 2012, p. 5-10). 
“Against the backdrop of the control variables, Tea Party candidates did not run significantly 
better than did Republicans without a Tea Party endorsement” (Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton 
2012, p. 10). Bond, Fleisher, and Ilderton (2012) conclude that the Tea Party had relatively little 
effect on the outcomes of the 2010 midterm elections.  
Jacobson (2011) notes that the Tea Party movement capitalized on preexisting views. The 
Tea Party was overtly and overwhelmingly opposed to Barack Obama. This translated into 
dissatisfaction with other members of the Democratic Party. Unlike Karpowitz, Monson, 
Patterson, and Pope (2011) and Bond, Fleisher and Ilderton (2012), Jacobson (2011) does find an 
effect on independent voters and attributes the rate at which independents voted for Republicans 
largely to the Tea Party. In conclusion, Jacobson mentions that voters, although they would have 
preferred more moderates in office, subsequently voted for candidates with more extreme views 
who enacted more extreme policies (Jacobson 2011).  
 Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011) focus on the effects that Tea Party members of 
Congress have had on the votes of other members of the Republican Party.  They find that 
members of the House Tea Party Caucus were more likely to take positions and vote farther to 
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the right of how they would be predicted to vote. An endorsement from Freedom Works did not 
affect voting behavior. The authors do find that members from districts with a strong Tea Party 
presence did tend to vote generally with the Republican Party but also broke with the Party on 
issues particularly important to the Tea Party, such as the expansion of government. The effect of 
membership in the House Tea Party Caucus was not consistently correlated with particular 
positions and patterns in voting (Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel 2011).   
 This research has only started to look at the effects of the Tea Party in Congress. Bailey, 
Mummolo, and Noel (2011) seek to identify on which policy issues the Tea Party affiliated 
members broke with the establishment Republican Party in votes in the House of 
Representatives. It has been well-documented that Tea Party supporters are generally more 
conservative than the public (Zernike and Thee-Brenan 2010). It is the potential shift in the 
moderate Republicans the Tea Party has been able to affect which holds the key to the 
disproportionately large amount of the agenda they were able to control in Congress in 2011 and 
2012. Bailey, Mummolo, and Noel (2011) have noted that Tea Party members of Congress were 
not able to affect much change in the positions of other Republican members of Congress but 
their data only includes votes before the middle of 2011, limiting their sample size.  
 The previous literature paints a good picture of who the Tea Party supporters are and 
what their values and motivations may be. Another portion focuses on Tea Party members in 
Congress. Some research moves in to theories and models behind the outcomes of the 2010 
elections. A large part of the outcomes, when looking at the results only in terms of Democratic 
or Republican victories, or the effect on incumbents, seems to be explained with what happens to 
incumbent parties when the economy is performing poorly or other theories of “nationalized” 
elections (Aldrich , Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012). Aldrich, Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, 
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and Rohde also find that Democratic losses were related to opposition to legislation and the 
inability to improve economic conditions.  
What the research does not address is what was different that led to candidates being 
successful and then identifying themselves with the Tea Party in Congress. Polling data shows 
that Tea Party supporters were distinctive from the United States electorate as a whole, but many 
of these same characteristics overlap with supporters of the Republican Party. This goes a long 
way to explaining why all of the members of the House Tea Party Caucus, a highly observable 
measure of Tea Party identity, are Republicans rather than Democrats.  
These two factors taken together crowd out the effect of the Tea Party and provide little 
explanation for why the movement came about at all and why it translated into electoral 
successes. The constraints suggested by the demographics and the theoretical framework 
regarding the economy and midterm elections could both easily have been satisfied by electing 
any other Republican Member of Congress. This provides evidence of the need to isolate the 
factors that led to districts electing Tea Party Members of Congress as opposed to other 
Republicans. 
The years between the 2008 and 2010 elections saw three events that had major effects 
on the country (Aldrich, Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012 mention similar effects as 
what is discussed next). The first was political. The election of President Barack Obama was 
historic not just because it marked the beginning of a new presidential administration but because 
this marked the election of the first African-American president. This represented incredible 
historic change and set the tone for the era to be one of “hope” for the country going forward. As 
much of a positive movement as it was, it also marked a turning away from the Bush presidency. 
The 2008 election also resulted in major Democratic victories in the United States House of 
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Representatives and the United States Senate. This gave Democrats a majority in the House and 
eventually a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate (Cillizza 2009). This political balance had 
significant policy results, as will be discussed later on.  
The second major event was a crisis more than anything else. The months leading up to 
the 2008 election were particularly damaging for the American economy. The fall of 2008 saw 
several shocks to the macroeconomy with the failure of big investment banks such as Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers. The stock market plummeted and foreclosures and unemployment 
continued to rise. At the very end of his administration, President Bush and Congress together 
passed and signed legislation in an attempt to stimulate the economy. Then-senator Obama and 
Senator McCain sharply turned to focus on their plans for the staggering United States economy.  
The third factor was the historic policy achievements of the President and Democrats in 
Congress between 2009 and 2010. By the time President Obama took office in January of 2009, 
the economy was far from stabilized. He moved quickly to work with Congress to pass and sign 
a massive $787 billion stimulus (Fritze 2009). Separate from that was the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program, popularly called “bank bailouts” (Sullivan and Frank 2010). These measures would 
only begin to put the economy on the right track, if at all, given how deep and widespread the 
economic downturn really was and its relationship to the global economy which placed a portion 
of the solution out of the reach of domestic legislative politics. As the country geared up for the 
2010 midterm elections, the economy was on the top of voters’ list of priorities. The dismal 
economic situation led to a heightened anti-incumbent sentiment in the electorate and low 
congressional approval ratings. 
But the policy which possibly engendered the strongest backlash was the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA), which the President signed in August of 2010 (Stolberg and Pear 2010). Health care 
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has been a sensitive issue in American political history, and the Affordable Care Act was 
particularly ambitious in scope. This was the first time in decades that a President and Congress 
were able to pass a comprehensive health care reform bill. Previous attempts, such as President 
Clinton’s reform bill in 1993, faced heavy opposition from the insurance and health care industry 
in general. The anti-health care reform efforts in 1993 were well funded (Clymer, Pear and Toner 
1994). The complicated nature of the health care industry makes attempts at reform particularly 
difficult. Reforms virtually necessitate unusually large pieces of legislation and components 
which can be difficult to distill into sound bites that would be appropriate for commercials and 
consumption by the average voter. The result is that health care reform efforts have a tendency to 
be misunderstood by voters and appear as inefficient overregulation by the government. The 
failed attempts at health care reform have often been cited as one of the main causes of the heavy 
Democrat losses in the 1994 midterm election (Berke 1994). Given the history of health care 
reform in America, it is not surprising that many Tea Party candidates who were ultimately 
elected into the 2011 freshman class in the House of Representatives focused on opposition to 
the newly passed and little understood Affordable Care Act, in addition to voters’ economic 
woes. 
Many political scientists have cast the 2010 midterm elections as “nationalized” 
elections, ones in which voters made decisions about whom to vote for based on national 
conditions. In this light, the midterm results were a reaction to Barack Obama and national 
conditions (Aldrich , Bishop, Hatch, Hillygus, and Rohde 2012). Based on the literature on the 
few points on which various Tea Party candidates and groups seem to agree, the economy 
(including government spending) and the Affordable Care Act seemed to be two of the most 
important factors for mobilization. To the extent that it is the case that the midterm elections 
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were or were not “nationalized,” it is important to look at the national context within which the 
Tea Party formed, particularly the social and economic changes pre-crisis (2006) up until the 
2010 midterms. As research has suggested the economy was among voters’ top concerns, 
economic conditions may have been very important. 
American Community Survey data show that between 2006 and 2010, total national 
population grew 3.3%. Racial composition stayed roughly the same, though the Hispanic portion 
of the population increased 1.6%. Median age increased by a paltry 0.8%. Despite the down 
economy, median household income actually increased 3.29%. As might be expected given the 
hit the housing market took during what was dubbed “The Great Recession,” owner-occupied 
housing units with a mortgage declined 1.7%, and median home value dropped 5.1%.  
Table 1 
 
Unemployment levels show surprising trends about the demographics this recession most 
affected. The national unemployment rate increased from 6.4% to 10.8% between 2006 and 
2010. The group that saw the highest percentage point increase in unemployment was Hispanics 
(a 5.4% increase to end at 12.9%). Blacks still had the highest unemployment level by racial 
breakdown with 17.9%. The unemployment rate for Whites saw the smallest increase of 4.2%, 
for an overall rate of 9.5%; however, in terms of its initial rate in 2006, unemployment for 
Snapshot Social and Economic 
Characteristics 2010 
% of 
Population 
% Change 
2006-2010 2006 
% of 
Population 
Total Population 309,349,689   3.30% 299,398,485   
White 229,397,472 74.20%   221,331,507 73.90% 
Black 38,874,625 12.60%   37,051,483 12.40% 
Hispanic 50,740,089 16.40%   44,252,278 14.80% 
Median Age 37.2     36.4   
Median Household Income 50,046   3.29% 48,451   
Owner-occupied housing units 
with a mortgage 50,339,500   -1.70% 51,234,170   
Median Home Value 197,300   -5.10% 208,000   
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Whites increased the most. The unemployment rates by age group show that the largest pure 
percentage increase was 8%, from 21.7% to 29.7% for those 16-19 years of age. The relative 
ranking of age groups by highest level of unemployment did not change between 2006 and 2010. 
Perhaps the most striking change is the unemployment rate by sex. In 2006, unemployment for 
men and women was at rough parity at 5.5% and 5.9%, respectively. Men, however, saw an 
almost doubling of their unemployment rate, a 5.3% increase, between 2006 and 2010 as 
compared with women’s 3.4% increase to end in 2010 at 10.8% unemployment for men and 
9.3% unemployment for women.  
Table 2 
Unemployment 2010 
% Change 2006-
2010 2006 
 
10.80% 68.8%  6.4% 
White 9.50% 79.2% 5.3% 
Black 17.90% 42.1% 12.6% 
Hispanic 12.90% 72.0% 7.50% 
16-19 years 29.7% 36.9% 21.7% 
20-24 years 16.9% 50.9% 11.2% 
25 to 44 years 10.0% 78.6% 5.6% 
45 to 54 years 8.6% 95.5% 4.4% 
55 to 64 years 8.1% 113.2% 3.8% 
65 to 74 years 7.9% 107.9% 3.8% 
75 years and over 6.9% 91.7% 3.6% 
Male 10.80% 96.4% 5.5% 
Female 9.30% 57.6% 5.9% 
 
The composition of the American economy, in terms of which industries took up the 
largest shares of individuals employed, changed slightly as well. The industry to employ the 
largest portion of the population was by far the category of educational services, health care, and 
social assistance, which accounted for 23.2% of the population in 2010 and 20.8% in 2006. In 
2006, the next largest industry was manufacturing, employing 11.6% of the population. In 2010, 
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the manufacturing industry employed only 10.4% of the population, with retail trade replacing it 
for the second largest industry by share of the population employed, at 11.7%.  
The Tea Party 16: Its Freshman Class and the Districts that Elected Them 
 When the dust cleared after the 2010 midterms and the new 112
th
 Congress officially 
took office, the newly formed Tea Party Caucus in the House of Representatives boasted 60 
members. As previous literature has suggested and as an even cursory glance of the Tea Party 
Caucus reveals, many of these members held ideas consistent with the Tea Party before the 
movement ever really took shape and were far from being new to Congress in the 2010 midterm 
elections. To really measure the change then and the influence of the Tea Party in electing 
members to Congress who otherwise might not have been elected, it is critical to focus on the 
freshman members of the Tea Party Caucus as opposed to all members. These freshman 
members may be taken as a more accurate picture of the “byproduct” of the popular movement 
since the incumbent members had some sort of preexisting background and network in politics 
prior to the movement. 
 For the purposes of this research, members will only be considered freshman if their first 
term in Congress came from an electoral victory in 2010. This leaves 16 members of the Tea 
Party Caucus, collectively from Florida (four members), Illinois (1), Kansas (1), Louisiana (1), 
Michigan (1), Mississippi (1), Missouri (1), South Carolina (2), Tennessee (2), Texas (1), and 
West Virginia (1). The geographic distribution of these members is mostly Southern, with 12 
members from southern states (Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, West 
Virginia and Tennessee). In order to form a better idea of which factors contributed to the 
success of these candidates in these particular districts, analysis of each district and member in 
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2010 will be helpful. This may illuminate some trends that were common to the districts that 
elected candidates in 2010 who joined the Tea Party Caucus in 2011.  
Florida 5-Richard Nugent 
In 2010, Richard Nugent was elected to represent Florida’s fifth congressional district, an 
area that, according to Barone and McCutcheon’s 2012 Almanac of American Politics, has seen 
fairly quick development, with population growth of 45.4% between 2000 and 2010 (Barone and 
McCutcheon 2011). Culturally, the district has a large retiree population. (Barone and 
McCutcheon 2011).  
 Representative Nugent’s candidacy in 2010 was somewhat of a surprise. The incumbent 
Representative Ginny Brown-Waite originally announced that she intended to seek another term 
in Congress but just after the filing cutoff time for candidates to put their names on the ballot for 
2010, she announced that she would not be running and effectively endorsed Nugent instead, 
then the sheriff of Hernando County. The electoral focus in the district was apparent from the 
start when Nugent in his comments with Brown-Waite, lauded her efforts on behalf of veterans 
and seniors (Matthews 2010). Veterans make up 16.3% of the population (Barone and 
McCutcheon 2011). The district is fairly safely Republican, with John McCain having won in 
2008 with 56% of the vote (Cizilla 2010). 
 Nugent was not originally the Tea Party favorite. Tea Party support mostly went to his 
primary opponent Jason Sager (Barone and McCutcheon). Nugent’s rhetoric during the 
campaign focused on Sager’s Social Security and Medicare plans (Baron and McCutcheon 
2011). Nugent also, however, focused heavily on his plans to fix the American economy, 
including decreasing government spending, cutting taxes. He was quoted as saying, “We need to 
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stop spending in Washington. You have to take that responsibility” (Show 2010). He defeated 
Sager in the primary and went on to run against Jim Piccillo in the general election. 
 Overall, Nugent vastly outraised Piccillo, mounting $518,609 compared to Piccillo’s 
$146,686 (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Nugent’s top individual contributors were 
individuals from The Villages, a large retirement community in the district, followed by 
employees of the U.S. Army and employees of a construction group. By sector, Ideological and 
Single Issue groups made up the largest portion of his campaign contributions, totaling $99,574, 
followed by the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector with $87,695 (Center for Responsive 
Politics 2011). Nugent’s rhetoric in the general also focused on spending and the stimulus bill 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011). He defeated Piccillo 68% to 33% (Center for Responsive 
Politics 2011). 
 Once in Congress, Nugent joined the House Tea Party Caucus and proved himself to be 
solidly conservative. The National Journal in 2012 ranked him the 107
th
 most conservative 
member of the House of Representatives (with lower numbers being more conservative). His 
Composite Conservative score was 76.3 (with higher numbers being more conservative), scoring 
71 on economic issues, and 83 on social issues (Morris & Bell 2012). CQ weekly’s report on 
Party Unity, which measures the percentage of times a member voted with his/her party on bills 
in which the vote breakdown pitted more than 50% of Democrats against more than 50% of 
Republicans showed that Representative Nugent voted 97% with his party (Ethridge 2012).  
Florida 12-Dennis Ross 
Florida’s 12th District saw rapid population growth (31.7%) between 2000 and 2010 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Just between 2006 and 2010, the population grew 8.4%. This 
district is more reliant on farming than anywhere else in the state (Barone and McCutcheon 
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2011) but “proportionately, there are more manufacturing jobs here than almost anywhere else in 
Florida (though still not very many)” and not enough to make the district more towards 
manufacturing than agriculture (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). The portion of the district that 
includes Osceola County brings a demographic of more “younger, bro-business families” 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011) though the district overall has a large retirement population. 
In 2010, Dennis Ross faced a separate Tea Party candidate in the general election by the 
name of Randy Wilkinson (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). However, FreedomWorks endorsed 
Ross rather than Wilkinson (The Washington Post 2011). During the campaign, Ross focused on 
opposition to the Affordable Care Act and stronger immigration legislation (Barone and 
McCutcheon 2011). Dennis Ross raised $1,174,682 compared to Democrat Lori Edwards’ 
$655,720 and Wilkinson’s $45,120 (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Ross’ largest 
individual donor was Publix Super Markets. Like Nugent, The Villages were in Ross’ top five 
individual contributors, pulling in at number four on the list. The industries that contributed the 
most to his campaign were Leadership PACs, Insurance, Food Processing & Sales, Health 
Professionals, and Real Estate. The overall sector that contributed most to his campaign was 
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). 
Ross won with 48% of the vote (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Once in Congress, 
he joined the Tea Party Caucus and was tapped to head the subcommittee on the Federal 
Workforce, U.S. Postal Service and Labor Policy of the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee (The Washington Post 2011) and was initiated into the National Republican 
Congressional Committee’s “Young Guns” program (Blake 2010). In the National Journal’s 
2012 ranking of most conservative members of the House of Representatives, Ross landed in a  
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seven-way tie for the 94
th
 most conservative member (Morris & Bell 2012). He voted with the 
party 98% of the time on party unity votes (Ethridge 2012). 
Florida 22-Allen West 
 Florida’s 22nd district includes Palm Beach, Boca Raton, and Fort Lauderdale. The area 
has seen a good deal of development (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). The area is historically 
wealthy but felt the full force of the economic recession. “…Home prices were not expected to 
fully recover until 2030, according to Moody’s Economy.com” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, 
p. 421). 
Allen West ran in 2010 in Florida’s 22nd district against Democrat Ron Klein. West’s rhetoric 
during the campaign had blatant racial overtones at times and he has called himself a “right-wing 
extremist” (The Washington Post 2011). West outraised and outspent his opponent, with 
$6,542,738 on hand, compared to Klein’s $3,776,867. West’s top individual contributors were 
employees of Tbc Corp, Bank of America, Cable Marine Inc., Q-Med Corp., and Rick Case 
Automotive Group. By industry, West received the most contributions from groups representing 
the retired population, Republican/Conservative groups, Real Estate, other Finance, and 
Securities & Investment groups. By sector, individuals employed in Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate donated the most to his campaign (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). 
West won with 54% of the vote. Once in Congress, West voted with the Republican Party 
95% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal ranked him 174 on the Conservative 
Rankings list, with an overall score of 63.2 (Morris & Bell 2012). 
Florida 24-Sandy Adams 
 Florida’s 24th district includes the suburbs of Orlando, Daytona Beach, and New Smyrna 
Beach. Orlando’s strong tourism industry and varied economy have helped it weather the 
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recession better than some other areas of the state (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). “There are 
higher than average numbers of homeowners, families with children, working women, and 
white-collar employees” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 426). The district saw 25% 
population growth from 2000 to 2010 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).  
Sandy Adams ran in Florida’s 24th district in 2010 against Democrat incumbent Suzanne 
Kosmas (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Kosmas raised and outspent Adams with 
$2,540,354 compared to Adams’ $1,328,778. Adams’ largest individual donor was Publix Super 
Markets. Her top five industries were Leadership PACs, Health Professionals, Retired persons, 
Lawyers and Law firms, and candidate committees. The Sector that contributed most to Adams’ 
campaign was Ideological and Single-Issue groups, followed by other business groups/interests. 
Barone and McCutcheon note that this 2010 race was marked by outside spending by the 
Chamber of Commerce and the Club for Growth. Adams partially campaigned against the ACA 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011). 
In Congress, Adams has voted with Republicans 97% of the time (Ethridge 2012). The 
National Journal gives her a conservative ranking of 31 with an overall score of 86.8 (Morris & 
Bell 2012). 
Illinois 8-Joe Walsh 
 Illinois’ 8th Congressional District includes the area around Chicago and Schaumburg and 
is home to the head offices of several large businesses including Motorola and Zurich North 
America insurance. It has been rapidly growing since the 1950s when it was a largely rural area 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Maybe partially because of this, Barone and McCutcheon point 
to cultural differences between Chicago and the 8
th
 district, pointing out that it is more similar to 
“the great rural Midwest than…yeasty, lusty Chicago” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 542). 
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The recession took a huge toll on the area. Schaumburg enacted a property tax when their 
normal way of raising revenue, the sales tax, no longer provided enough income. Motorola did 
not weather the recession well, shedding 4,000 jobs globally in 2008. The district voted for 
Barack Obama in 2008 by a margin of 56% to McCain’s 43% (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). 
The population grew 13% between 2000 and 2010; however, between 2006 and 2010 population 
actually declined 0.16%.  
 Joe Walsh’s campaign against Democrat incumbent Melissa Bean focused on her support 
for the Affordable Care Act and the massive spending in the stimulus bill. Walsh promised he 
would decrease taxes and spending. Although the race was competitive (Walsh won with 49% of 
the vote to Bean’s 48%), the National Republican Congressional Committee never jumped in the 
race in support of Walsh (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Walsh was heavily outraised and 
outspent with Bean raising $2,292,879 against Walsh’s $624,694. His top contributor was Sage 
Products. Cancer Treatment Center of America also appeared in his top five individual 
contributors. He received the most funding from the individuals in the Securities & Investment 
industry, followed by retirees. By sector, he received the most from individuals in Finance, 
Insurance, and Real Estate (Center for Responsive Politics 2011). Obama won this district with 
56% of the vote in 2008 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). 
 During his term in the House of Representatives, Walsh voted with Republicans 94% of 
the time (Ethridge 2012). The National Journal ranked him 162 on their conservative scale, with 
an overall score of 66.5, and being more conservative on social as opposed to economic issues 
(Morris & Bell 2012). 
 
 
23 
 
Kansas 1-Tim Huelskamp 
 Kansas’ 1st Congressional District is traditionally rural and was mostly prairie in the past. 
Now, the farming landscape has changed a bit with the presence of “Big meatpacking plants in 
Dodge City, Garden City and Liberal (the “Golden Triangle of meatpacking”)…” which “have 
attracted large numbers of Hispanic immigrants, mainly living in trailer parks” (Barone and 
McCutcheon, 2011, p. 643). Federal farm subsidies are very important to the district as between 
1995 and 2009 they were second only to the congressional district accounting for all of North 
Dakota in the amount of farm subsidies obtained from the U.S. government. The Hispanic 
population, according to Barone and McCutcheon is becoming more prevalent in the area 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011). Overall population declined 2.5% between 2000 and 2010 
(Barone and McCutcheon 2011). 
 Tim Huelskamp won the 2010 primary with 35% of the vote after he garnered the 
endorsements of both the National Rifle Association and former Governor Huckabee of 
Arkansas, a Fox commentator. In the general, he faced Alan Jilka and won with 74% of the vote 
to Jilka’s 23% (Barone and McCutcheon 2012). Huelskamp raised $1,185,350 to Jilka’s 
$162,130. Huelskamp’s largest contributor was Watco Companies, followed by Koch Industries. 
He received the most group/interest contributions from retirees and had the most support from 
the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).  
 During his tenure in the House, he voted with Republicans 96% of the time (Ethridge 
2012). The National Journal gave him a conservative ranking of 74, with a score of 80.2 overall. 
The National Journal also ranks him more conservative on social than on economic issues 
(Morris & Bell 2012).  
 
24 
 
Louisiana 3-Jeff Landry 
 Louisiana’s third district has a rich Cajun cultural history, which is well-reflected in Jeff 
Landry. Oil is an important industry in the district and employed the younger generation in the 
1960s and 1970s. In the past few years, the district has been hit by two environmental disasters, 
the first being Hurricane Katrina and the second the BP oil spill that occurred in 2010. The BP 
oil spill damaged the district’s economy at a time when the U.S. economy had still not made a 
full recovery. Hurricane Katrina caused significant flooding here. In St. Bernard’s parish, the 
flooding from Katrina wiped out the only hospital, which was not rebuilt until Louisiana’s state 
government granted $76 million to do so in January 2011 (Barone and McCutcheon 2011) 
 Jeff Landry ran for Congress in 2010 after Democrat Charlie Melancon decided not to 
run for another term and faced Democrat Ravi Sangisetty in the general. Landry mainly focused 
on opposing the ACA and reducing the spending in Washington. In addition, Landry mentioned 
the need to reform Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid, programs supported by many Tea 
Party voters (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).  
 Landry raised $1,362,786 to Sangisetty’s $828,014. Landry’s largest contributor was EP 
Breaux Electrical. Among his top five individual contributors were several other companies from 
the oil and gas industry, which was the industry that contributed most to his campaign. Health 
professionals also made the list of his top five contributing industries. In terms of sectors, Landry 
received most from general Business groups. He won with 64% of the vote.  
 Once in Congress, Landry stood with his party on unity votes 96% of the time (Ethridge 
2012). The National Journal ranked him 36 on their scale of most conservative members in 2011 
with an overall score of 85.8, and noted he was more conservative on economic than on social 
issues (Morris & Bell 2012).  
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Michigan 7-Tim Walberg 
 Michigan’s 7th Congressional District includes strong historically libertarian viewpoints. 
The area includes Hillsdale College which accepts no money from the national level. “In 1854, 
the [Republican] party was founded in the manufacturing and prison town of Jackson as a kind of 
reformist institution” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 840-841). In the 1930s, the area 
resisted New Deal programs and interventions and union presence. Socially, however, the district 
has been more liberal. The economy in the district has struggled with the decrease in the 
industrial sector, particularly in the automobile sector. (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). 
 Tim Walberg ran in the seventh district against incumbent Democrat Mark Schauer. 
During the campaign Walberg focused on Schauer’s support for the massive $787 billion 
stimulus package. The National Republican Congressional Committee jumped into the race, 
spending close to $1 million. Walberg also received half a million dollars from American Future 
Fund (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). In total, Walberg raised $1,678,049 but did not come 
close to Schauer’s $3,255,382. Walberg raised the most money from Ervin Industries. His top 
five contributors included Leadership PACs, retirees, Republican and Conservative groups, Real 
Estate, and Manufacturing and Distributing. His top sector for contributions was 
Ideological/Single-Issue, followed by Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate. Walberg won with 
50% of the vote (Center for Responsive Politics 2011).  
 Once in Congress, Walberg voted with the rest of the Republican Party 97% of the time 
(Ethridge 2012). The National Journal gave him a ranking of 40, with an overall score of 85. He 
was ranked more conservative on social as opposed to economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012). 
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Mississippi 4-Steven Palazzo 
 The 4
th
 Congressional District in Mississippi includes the Gulf Coast and Keesler Air 
Force Base. Hurricane Katrina took a toll on the area. Part of the money the state received after 
the storm, the state used to invest in developing Gulfport. The area was hit hard again when BP’s 
oil pump sprung a leak and led to massive amounts of oil which poured into the Gulf area. The 
district has historically been Republican, at least since the election of President Nixon in 1972 
and John McCain won the district with 67% of the vote. Palazzo “…describes his community as 
characterized by ‘God-fearing men and women’ who believe in faith and personal responsibility” 
(Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 922). 
 Steven Palazzo is a former Marine and the owner of Palazzo & Co. which focuses 
preparing tax documents for Americans living overseas. Palazzo ran against Democrat 
incumbent Gene Taylor in 2010. He accused opponent Taylor of advancing “a ‘liberal socialist 
agenda’” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 922). 
 Palazzo out-raised Taylor $1,079,453 to $855,983. He received his largest individual 
contribution from Horne CPA Group. His top five areas from which he drew contributions were 
Leadership PACs, Retirees, Health professionals, Accountants, and Real Estate. His top sector 
was Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate. He won with 52% of the vote to Taylor’s 47% (Center 
for Responsive Politics 2011). The National Journal ranked Palazzo 54 on their conservative 
scale with an overall score of 82.7, noting that he is more conservative on social than on 
economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).  
Missouri 4-Vicky Hartzler 
 Missouri’s 4th Congressional District “…includes part of Blue Springs and Oak Grove in 
Jackson County east of Kansas City, but the overall atmosphere here is rural and small-town” 
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(Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 942). The area also includes a military flavor from the two 
bases: Fort Leonard Wood and Whiteman Air Force Base. The district has mixed political 
heritage, which includes strong anti-slavery and pro-slavery factions. Unlike in the South, these 
coalitions did not realign their party affiliations. The anti-slavery factions have retained 
allegiance to the Republican Party while the pro-slavery forces continue to align themselves with 
the Democrats (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).  
 Vicky Hartzler ran against Ike Skelton, a long-serving Democratic representative and 
chair of the Armed Services Committee who historically enjoyed sweeping victories in the 
district. Hartzler was a teacher before being elected to the Missouri House of Representatives, 
from which she ended her political career there after the birth of her daughter. She has opposed 
gay marriage (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).   
 Vicky Hartzler faced Democrat incumbent Ike Skelton. Her campaign rhetoric focused on 
painting Skelton as connected to liberals in Congress, his support of the emergency stimulus 
measures and environmental regulations (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). She raised $1,373,530 
to Skelton’s $2,923,038 but won with 50% of the vote to Skelton’s 45%. Her largest contributor 
was Diamond Pet Foods. Her top five industries were retirees, Leadership PACs, Agricultural 
Services and Products, Republican and Conservative Groups, and Crop Production and Basic 
Processing. Her top sector overall was Ideological and Single-Issue groups.  
 Once in Congress, she voted with the rest of the Republican Party 97% of the time 
(Ethridge 2012). The National Journal gave her a score of 79.3 for a conservative ranking of 85. 
She was ranked slightly more conservative on social than economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).  
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South Carolina 3-Jeff Duncan 
 Jeff Duncan represents South Carolina’s 3rd Congressional District, an area that 
historically was comprised of family farms as opposed to large plantations in other areas of the 
South. The area once included a large plant used for making weapons for national defense, 
including nuclear materials. This provided many skilled jobs—when the facility shut down, 
12,000 people lost their jobs. The area received a large amount of funding from the national 
government as part of the economic recovery measures. Politically, the district was Democratic 
in the past but began to support Republicans for culturally conservative reasons during the 
1950s, as much of the rest of the South did. John McCain’s vote share in 2008 was 64% (Barone 
and McCutcheon 2011). 
 Jeff Duncan played football at Clemson University. He owned his own business, J. 
Duncan & Associates, which worked in real estate, before he was elected to the state House of 
Representatives. In that role, he introduced legislation to build a budget for South Carolina which 
rejected economic stimulus funding (Barone and McCutcheon 2011).   
 Jeff Duncan was running against Democrat Jane Dyer in 2010. He outraised and outspent 
her with $878,903 raised to her $266,698. His largest contributor was from Club for Growth, 
though he also received large contributions from individual groups in the health care industry. 
His top five industry contributors were Republican and conservative groups, retirees, Leadership 
PACs, Health professionals, and Electric Utilities. His largest sector contribution came from 
Ideological and Single-Issue groups. He beat Dyer 62% to 37% (Center for Responsive Politics 
2011). The National Journal gave him a conservative ranking of 113, with an overall score of 75. 
He is more conservative on social than on economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).  
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South Carolina 5-Mick Mulvaney 
South Carolina’s 5th Congressional District includes York and Lancaster counties, Sumter 
(and the Air Force base). Textile production was once a critical part of the district’s economy, 
however, that has since been replaced with more advanced typed of manufacturing (which 
provide a better standard of living). The district saw a significant spike in unemployment during 
the recession. The Charlotte area suburbs which spill across the state line include many residents 
“with no ancestral ties here and with strong conservative views” (Barone and McCutcheon 2012, 
p. 1458). Historically, the district has been Democratic, but like many other areas of the South, 
has begun to elect Republicans. John McCain won this district with 53% of the vote in 2008 
(Barone and McCutcheon, 2011). 
Mick Mulvaney upset the long-serving Democratic chair of the House Budget 
Committee, John Spratt. Mulvaney previously served as a state representative and state senator 
where he proved himself to be economically conservative. He joined Governor Sanford in 
refusing stimulus funding from the national level. “He kept a Gadsden flag—“DON’T TREAD 
ON ME”—on his Senate desk” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1458). Mulvaney emphasized 
his opposition to the Affordable Care Act in the 2010 election and garnered support from the 
Club for Growth and National Republican Congressional Committee (Barone and McCutcheon, 
2011). 
 Mick Mulvaney ran in the fifth district in 2010 against Democrat incumbent John M. 
Spratt, Jr. Mulvaney was outraised $1,647,870 to $2,035,361. His largest individual contribution 
came from the Club for Growth. The Freedom Project and Fund for America’s Future were also 
among his top five largest individual contributors. By industry, he received most from retirees, 
though health professionals and Real Estate were also among his top five. By sector, he received 
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the most from Ideological/Single-Issue groups. He won election with 55% of the vote to Spratt’s 
45% (Center for Responsive Politics, 2011). The National Journal ranked him more conservative 
on social than on economic issues (Morris & Bell 2012).  
Tennessee 6-Diane Black 
 Tennessee’s 6th district includes the central region of the state. It has historically 
Democratic roots; even electing Al Gore, Jr. as its congressman.  Its economic background is 
mostly agricultural but companies have started to move into the area. The Nissan Altima is 
manufactured in the district and General Mills is planning to increase development of their 
manufacturing centers in the area. The district is heavily conservative, voting for John McCain 
62% to President Obama’s 37% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011).  
 Diane Black is originally from Baltimore. She served in the Tennessee House of 
Representatives starting in 1998 and the state senate in 2004. She proved herself to be 
conservative both economically and socially. She opposed gay marriage, tax increases, and was 
tough on illegal immigration. She also introduced legislation that would permit individuals in the 
state to not participate in the Affordable Care Act requirements (Barone and McCutcheon 2011). 
Diane Black ran against Democrat Brett Carter. She vastly outraised him $2,238,011 to 
$215,355 and beat him with 67% of the vote (Center for Responsive Politics 2011, Barone and 
McCutcheon 2011). She received her largest individual contribution from National HealthCare 
Corp. Several other health-related groups were among her top five individuals contributions. By 
industry, she received most from health professionals, followed by retirees. The sector from 
which she drew the most funding was Health. The National Journal put her in a tie for most 
conservative member of the House with six other members in 2011. She was ranked more 
conservative on economic than social issues (Morris & Bell 2012). 
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Tennessee 8-Stephen Lee Fincher 
 Tennessee’s 8th Congressional District has a largely rural portion of the state. It is poorer 
than the rest of the state. It includes the city of Jackson and the very north part of Memphis. This 
area has Democratic roots but has become more Republican, with John McCain winning the 
district 56% to Obama’s 43% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1508). 
 Stephen Lee Fincher “worked most of his life on the family farm” (Barone and 
McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1509). He also travels with family members singing gospel. In 2010, he 
immediately established himself as an excellent fundraiser. Fincher ran against Democrat Roy 
Herron in 2010. Fincher slightly outraised Herron $2,724,526 to $2,103,121. Fincher’s largest 
individual contributions came from Club for Growth. His top five industries were crop 
production and basic processing, retirees, Leadership PACs, oil and gas, and Republican and 
conservative groups. By sector, Fincher received the most from Agribusiness (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2011). He won the election with 59% of the vote to Herron’s 39% (Barone 
and McCutcheon, 2011).  
Like his freshman Tea Party colleague from Tennessee, Diane Black, the National 
Journal ranked Fincher one of the seven most conservative members of the House of 
Representatives (Morris & Bell 2012). He is more conservative on economic than on social 
issues. Despite this, “he supported the fiscal 2011 budget deal that President Barack Obama 
struck with GOP leaders in April 2011” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1509). 
Texas 27-Blake Farenthold 
 Texas’ 27th district includes a large Hispanic population. The area covers Corpus Christi, 
down to the Texas-Mexico border. Tourism is a big industry for the district and work on building 
a wind farm is under way. The area’s economy benefited from NAFTA, but some parts of the 
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district continue to struggle. The district typically votes Democratic, but not overwhelmingly so. 
Barack Obama’s vote share in 2008 in the district was only 53% (Barone and McCutcheon 
2011). 
 Farenthold is from Corpus Christi. He graduated from law school but ultimately switched 
focus and turned to radio broadcasting. Blake Farenthold ran for election against Democrat 
incumbent Solomon P. Ortiz who outspent him $1,223,982 to $616,618. Farenthold’s campaign 
focused on dismantling the Affordable Care Act. Farenthold narrowly beat Ortiz, winning by 
only 799 votes. Farenthold’s largest individual contribution came from Bay Ltd. He drew 
considerable support from the oil and gas industry, Leadership PACs, health professionals, 
contractors, and businesses. By sector, he received the most support from Ideological and Single-
Issue groups (Center for Responsive Politics 2011, Barone and McCutcheon 2011).  
West Virginia 1-David McKinley 
 West Virginia’s 1st Congressional District includes the North area of the state, close to 
the Ohio border. It comprises Wheeling, Weirton, Morgantown (home to West Virginia 
University), and Parkersburg. Economically, it has been heavily reliant on steel and coal 
production, which have been hit hard in the last couple of decades. The after-effects of a 
declining national steel and coal industry have not been consistent in the district. In some areas, 
the new economy has moved has moved in to fill the void with new jobs in services, but others 
continue to struggle.  
The political leanings of the district have, in some respects, mirrored the economic 
changes. “For most of the 20th century, much of this territory was solidly Democratic. But 
dissatisfaction with the Clinton-Gore policies on coal mining and the environment helped 
Republican George W. Bush carry the district twice” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1742). 
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In 2010, the district elected David McKinley, a small business owner who “…switched 
parties in 1976 because he said he felt that the Democratic Party did not support limited 
government” (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 1742-1743). McKinley ran in 2010 against 
Democrat Mike Oliverio. McKinley tied Oliverio to the Democrat Congressional leadership and 
harmful environmental regulations while emphasizing his own opposition to the Affordable Care 
Act. He narrowly won, receiving 50.4% of the vote to 49.6% (Barone and McCutcheon, 2011, p. 
1743). McKinley outraised Oliverio $1,783,039 to $1,449,376. McKinley’s largest individual 
contributions came from Mepco LLC. By industry, McKinley received a large amount of support 
from the mining industry, retirees, Leadership PACs, health professionals and lawyers and law 
firms. By sector he received the most from Ideological and Single-Issue groups (Center for 
Responsive Politics 2011). 
Table 3 
Geography Median Age %White Population Growth (2006-2010) %SS 
National 37.2 74.2 3.3 28.4 
Florida-5 47.2 87.9 11.1 47.8 
Florida-12 38.3 75.4 8.4 34.3 
Florida-22 45.6 88.3 1.4% 34.2 
Florida-24 39.3 83.1 7.1% 30.8 
Illinois-08 36.6 79.3 -0.61% 22 
Kansas-01 39.2 90.1 0.66% 32.1 
Lousiana-03 35.9 66.4 4.8 30.5 
Michigan-07 39.9 89.1% -1.1% 32.6 
Mississippi-04 36.4 72% 5.8% 31 
Missouri-04 38.7 92% 3.6% 34.8 
South Carolina-03 39.6 76% 4.6% 37 
South Carolina-05 38.4 65.7% 8.2% 33.5 
Tennessee-06 36 87.9% 8.6% 28.4 
Tennessee-08 38.4 74.2% 2.7 33.3 
Texas-27 32.1 90.3 4.97% 28.9 
West Virginia-01 40.9 95.1 3.6 36 
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Table 4 
Geography Median HH 
Income 2010 
Median Home 
Value 2010 
Unemployment 2010 
National 50,046 197,300 10.8% 
Florida-5 42,473 158,300 14.3% 
Florida-12 42,150 143,800 13.6 
Florida-22 58,319 257,300 10.8 
Florida-24 51,960 174,900 10.9 
Illinois-08 67,740 237,800 11.8% 
Kansas-01 43,367 96,800 5.9% 
Lousiana-03 46,048 147,800 10.3% 
Michigan-07 46,606 132,500 13.6% 
Mississippi-04 40,201 132,200 11.7% 
Missouri-04 42,113 128,100 8.3% 
South Carolina-03 38,471 130,600 13% 
South Carolina-05 38,867 139,600 15.1% 
Tennessee-06 43,712 153,200 11.1% 
Tennessee-08 37,427 107,800 13% 
Texas-27 36,960 111,900 9.7% 
West Virginia-01 37,859 110,100 8.5% 
 
Table 5—2012 National Journal Scores and 2011 Voting 
Geography National 
Journal Score 
National Journal 
Economic Score 
National Journal 
Social Score 
Conservative 
Rank 
%Vote with 
Republicans 
National      
Florida-5 75.3 60 86 108 94% 
Florida-12 92.5 99 91 15 95% 
Florida-22 74.7 51 75 110 93% 
Florida-24 79.5 78 86 88 94% 
Illinois-08 59.2 68 54 182 88% 
Kansas-01 59.8 64 64 180 90% 
Lousiana-03 96.2 97 91 4 96% 
Michigan-07 85.3 87 85 48 94% 
Mississippi-04 86.5 81 80 40 96% 
Missouri-04 76.5 75 64 102 97% 
South Carolina-03 86.8 87 75 34 97% 
South Carolina-05 58.8 64 64 183 95% 
Tennessee-06 89.7 87 85 26 98% 
Tennessee-08 83.3 70 84 63 97% 
Texas-27 79.8 91 70 82 97% 
West Virginia-01 54.2 55 49 211 90% 
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These district profiles and the above summary statistics suggest that the differences 
between districts electing Tea Party-affiliated members of Congress are fairly idiosyncratic. 
Some (such as South Carolina’s 3rd District) are strongly conservative, but others are much more 
on the margin. This applies particularly to Joe Walsh’s district—the Illinois 8th, which he won 
with a small margin. These members were not uniformly running in open seats or against 
incumbents. Some members were up against strong Democratic incumbents with long histories 
of serving in the House of Representatives. Mick Mulvaney, for example, defeated the chair of 
the House Budget Committee.  
Patterns in demographic make-up of the districts are not consistent. West Virginia’s 1st 
Congressional District has a mostly white population, but Blake Farenthold’s district in Texas 
has a large Hispanic population (though they may have had lower turnout as is common in 
midterm elections). There is a fairly wide range of unemployment rates and median home values. 
Just looking at the data, it is difficult to isolate factors that would have been significantly 
different from what was going on in other districts that might have led to Tea Party success for 
these freshmen in these districts in particular.  
Popular commentary also seems to point to Tea Party members as being more 
conservative than the average voter, average Member of Congress, or even average Republicans. 
The National Journal rankings for 2012, however (Table 5), do not show the freshmen members 
of the Tea Party Caucus to necessarily be more conservative than other Republicans and they 
have mostly voted with their party.  This lack of unifying characteristics suggests it would be 
useful to look at these members in a more systemic way. For this, a more quantitative analysis is 
used. 
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Data and Methods 
Data and other research have found Tea Party Members of Congress to be similar to other 
Republicans and that the 2010 election fits the standard model of midterm election voting when 
the economy is struggling. The quantitative analysis will focus on isolating factors that may set 
freshmen members of the Tea Party Caucus apart from all Members of Congress, other 
freshmen, and other Republicans; as well as what might have set Tea Party Caucus members 
apart from other Republicans and all Members of Congress. These districts could have elected 
other freshmen members (if the dissatisfaction was with incumbents, and the sentiment was anti-
Washington establishment) or other Republicans (if dissatisfaction was with the incumbent party 
itself). It is also useful to compare them to all Members of Congress to get a sense of how they 
are different from the general Congressional body though the effects that result from this are 
likely to be noisy as it does not control for the Republicans, with whom Tea Party freshmen 
share many features.  
 Polls that ask respondents about Tea Party support show that Tea Party supporters are 
more likely to be older, whiter, wealthier, and more educated than the average voter. The 2010 
midterm elections took place in the middle of an economic crisis for the country. Although not 
necessarily representative of the movement’s supporters, rhetoric surrounding the Tea Party at 
times included anger and resentment. Polling data from Skocpol even suggests some resentment 
towards the younger generation and more negative views of African-Americans. What the 
polling data does not tell us is what made districts more likely to elect Tea Party members of the 
Republican Party instead of other Republican candidates or candidates who had not previously 
served in Congress.  
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 Tea Party identity will first be defined as freshman members of the Tea Party Caucus in 
the House of Representatives. Total membership in the Tea Party Caucus is 60 with 16 of those 
members being freshman representatives. Limiting the analysis to the freshmen members 
removes the phenomenon that members of Congress had pre-existing ideologies which were 
already represented in Congress and which preempted the movement, though later analysis will 
also examine all members of the Tea Party Caucus. Freshmen membership in the Caucus can be 
seen as a function of two factors: their desire to be recognized as allied with the Tea Party and 
commitment to their policy objectives, and the extent to which the movement may have made the 
difference between them winning or losing their election. This isolates the effect of the 
movement on which candidates were elected. 
 The link between economic crisis and political extremism is well-documented. There are 
also some hypotheses surrounding the Tea Party which hint at the social shifts that have taken 
place in the recent past in American economic and public life. Given the rhetoric that is 
associated with the Tea Party, the economic conditions at the time, and what previous research 
shows about the concerns of movement supporters (against the bailouts, healthcare, and big 
government), it is useful to look at the district demographics (social and economic) that may 
have led to a district electing a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus. 
 Data concerning demographic and economic trends comes from the 1 year estimates of 
the 2010 American Community Survey, which gives an overview of the conditions in each 
congressional district around the time of the 2010 midterm elections. This is a smaller sample 
size than the full Census data; however, the Census data is not available broken down by 
congressional district, which is a significant advantage to using the ACS.  
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 Full campaign funding data for statistical analyses come from the “total receipts” 
category in Federal Election Commission reports. Some races attracted large amounts of funding 
which may have been paramount to electoral success. For this reason, these analyses control for 
level of campaign contributions. They also represent institutional support and implicitly measure 
support from a variety of interest groups and individuals.  
DW scores for members of Congress elected in 2008 (111
th
 Congress) are used as a 
measure of ideology. Although the DW scores for the members of Congress elected in 2010 are 
available, they are not used here as the statistical analyses are predicting a relationship about an 
outcome in 2010. The DW scores for the members of the 112
th
 Congress were measured after 
they were in fact elected and are based on events that happened after 2010, so would not 
necessarily be good determinants of the 2010 results. Furthermore, using the DW scores for the 
112
th
 Congress would assume that  the ideologies of candidates did not change upon entering 
Congress and that voters would have been aware of a candidate’s ideology at the time of election 
(either via voting record or through some sort of signaling from the candidates themselves). 
Although it is probably not too problematic to make the assumption that candidates signal their 
ideologies to voters and that voters are aware of the ideology, it would nevertheless be 
speculative. 
 DW scores from the 111
th
 Congress also have an interesting role in the model. Since the 
ideology is really a measure of the previous representative, this variable measures the reaction of 
the district to that member’s ideology or voting record. Given the anti-incumbent sentiment in 
2010, this is a useful relationship to measure. This also looks at the potential strategy involved 
and compares Tea Party freshmen to the members they were defeating or replacing.  
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 Polling data and previous research provide good starting points as to what are the 
appropriate determinants of support for freshmen Members of Congress who join the Tea Party 
Caucus versus incumbent Tea Party members of Congress. The broader context of the economic 
crisis, the many incumbent members of congress who lost seats in 2010, and the backlash to the 
economic stimulus and bank bailouts reveal that increased Tea Party support may have been the 
result of several factors including dissatisfaction with the current political leaders, opposition to 
the President, the unstable economic environment, and increasing size of government. 
 The independent variables included in the analysis are DW scores of the previously-
elected members of congress, the unemployment rate in the district, percentage of the population 
that is white, median home value, and percentage of the population that receives Social Security 
benefits. This last variable may be particularly interesting as it may line up with polling data and 
the informational interview data from Skocpol about the attitudes towards Social Security 
benefits.  It is also highly correlated with age, which is an important feature of Tea Party 
supporters. The other factors measure some of the most significant economic changes from the 
recession and most prominent characteristics of Tea Party supporters. Given the support from 
higher income brackets, median household income is included in this analysis.  
Median home value is an implicit measure of the collapse of the housing market and is 
also a good measure of wealth, as many Americans hold much of their household wealth in their 
homes. To look at the effect of the housing crisis itself, the ratio of median home value in 2010 
to the value in 2006 is also used, as is the ratio of 2010 to 2006 median household income. 
Unemployment is often used as a measure of economic health and is included in a significant 
amount of political rhetoric, implying it is a paramount concern to voters. Unemployment would 
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also have been one of the ways in which individuals were most acutely and directly affected by 
the recession. 
 Many of the economic conditions are correlated with individual characteristics. The first 
level of analysis is simply the bivariate correlations for each variable with the binary dependent 
variable of being a Tea Party freshman (equal to 1 if an individual is in that group), compared 
against the groups: all members of Congress, all freshmen, and all Republicans. This isolates the 
factors that may have been the most relevant to Tea Party electoral success. Standardized values 
for these variables are then tested with a logit analysis to measure the effects of each variable on 
the probability that a district would elect a candidate who would be a freshman member of the 
Tea Party Caucus.  
 The logit analysis also specifies Tea Party as a binary dependent variable equal to 1 for a 
freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus and 0 otherwise. This creates a very small sample 
size, which makes the actual effect difficult to estimate but can still specify a more general 
relationship between conditions in the districts and electing a Tea Party freshman. This analysis 
is extended to all members of the House Tea Party Caucus, as many other studies have used. 
This allows for a larger sample size and a systemic treatment of all members to examine if the 
broader measure of Tea Party identity is significant in a different way. Because of the presence 
of both social and economic factors and the effect that social factors many times have on 
economic outcomes, and the overlapping and high correlation between economic factors 
themselves, lean models are used to test the significance of the factors individually. Combining 
the models is more difficult as the high degree of collinearity between variables and the small 
number of Tea party freshmen detracts from the effect. 
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 A third level of analysis focuses on the effect of characteristics of districts on the margin 
of victory for Tea Party freshmen. This includes interaction terms for the different economic and 
social variables that were important in the first two analyses. The interaction term allows a test 
for how those factors and being a Tea Party freshman may have affected the competitiveness of a 
certain race to see if together those factors are significant. 
Results 
 A bivariate correlation analysis of TP identity (measured as 1 if a representative is a 
freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus and zero otherwise) with respect to all Members of 
Congress shows that the percentage of the population receiving Social Security benefits is 
positively correlated with the likelihood that a district will elect a candidate who will join the Tea 
Party Caucus as a freshman Member of Congress. This is highly correlated with age, but it 
should be noted that age, on its own, is not significantly correlated with Tea Party identity. The 
median home value in a district is negatively correlated with TP identity, as is median household 
income. This is interesting, given the higher average income among Tea Party supporters that 
polling data indicates.  
The unemployment in 2010 in a district was not correlated in any significant way with 
the likelihood that a representative would be a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus. 
Ideology of the district does not significantly affect the outcomes, nor does the level of campaign 
contributions, the median age in a district, unemployment, or the percentage of the population 
that is white in a district. Some of this runs directly contrary to the polling data, which suggests 
that Tea Party supporters are more likely to consider themselves to be conservative than the 
average voter.  
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When these factors are combined into a logit model (with Tea Party identification 
specified in the same manner as before), to test the factors that may have led to an increased 
probability that a district would elect a candidate who would become a freshman member of the 
Tea Party Caucus, some of the effects from the variables change. Each model controls for DW-
NOMINATE score, campaign contributions, the population growth between 2006 (before the 
recession) and 2010, and the percentage of the population that is white in the district. After 
controlling for these factors, the percentage of a district that receives Social Security benefits is 
positive and significant in predicting which districts elected freshmen Tea Party members. 
Unemployment rate in 2010 for a district is also positively correlated and significant. Population 
growth is also strongly and significantly correlated with electing a Tea Party member.  
 DW-NOMINATE score is not consistently significant. After controlling for funding and 
the percentage white in a population, the DW-NOMINATE score becomes significant and 
negatively correlated with being a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus, but the 
relationship declines to insignificance when the 2010 unemployment rate is used instead of 
Social Security beneficiaries or median household income. Funding is not significant in any of 
the models. The percentage of the population that is white in a district is significant and positive 
when controlling for unemployment in 2010, median household income, and change in median 
household income or median home value between 2010 and 2006.  
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Table 6: TP Freshmen vs. All Members of Congress  
All Members of 
Congress TP 
Dw 
score 
Median HH 
Income 2010 
2010 
Median Age 
2010 
Median 
Home Value 2010 UE % w/SS % White Funding 
TP 1 -.030 -.098
*
 .086 -.117
*
 .028 .163
**
 .091 .043 
Dw score -.030 1 .086 .139
**
 -.223
**
 -.255
**
 .145
**
 .387
**
 .019 
Median HH 
Income 2010 
-.098
*
 .086 1 .173
**
 .667
**
 -.428
**
 -.371
**
 .063 .195
**
 
2010 Median 
Age 
.086 .139
**
 .173
**
 1 -.002 -.211
**
 .700
**
 .495
**
 .133
**
 
2010 Median 
Home Value 
-.117
*
 -.223
**
 .667
**
 -.002 1 -.128
**
 -.388
**
 -.301
**
 .064 
2010 UE .028 -.255
**
 -.428
**
 -.211
**
 -.128
**
 1 .090 -.497
**
 -.151
**
 
% w/SS .163
**
 .145
**
 -.371
**
 .700
**
 -.388
**
 .090 1 .412
**
 .010 
% White .091 .387
**
 .063 .495
**
 -.301
**
 -.497
**
 .412
**
 1 .140
**
 
Funding .043 .019 .195
**
 .133
**
 .064 -.151
**
 .010 .140
**
 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Comparing Tea Party freshmen to other freshmen members isolates them from districts 
who either did not re-elect an incumbent or had open races. This is relevant given the high level 
of anti-incumbent sentiment in the electorate and the extent to which freshmen face many of the 
same types of challenges when running either for an open seat or against an incumbent. The 
bivariate correlations for this group comparison, show that only the percentage of the district’s 
population receiving Social Security benefits have a significant (positive) effect on the likelihood 
that the district would elect a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus. All of the multivariate 
logit models again control for DW-NOMINATE scores, campaign contributions, population 
growth, and the percentage of the district that is white.  
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Percentage of Social Security beneficiaries in the district is again positively and 
significantly correlated with electing a freshman Tea Party candidate in the logit model, as is 
2010 unemployment rate. Unlike the comparison with all Members of Congress, DW-
NOMINATE score, population growth, and the percentage of the population that is white are not 
significant in any of the models. 
 
Comparing Tea Party freshmen against other Republicans, the relationship between 
Social Security and Tea Party identity hold and is stronger than with the other two groups. 
Median household income and median home value both display a significant, negative 
relationship to Tea Party identity. Higher unemployment in districts which elected Republicans 
increased the likelihood that a member would be in the Tea Party. DW-NOMINATE for the first 
time consistently exhibits a significant, negative relationship on being in the Tea Party. 
In a logit model which controls for DW-NOMINATE, campaign contributions, 
population growth and percentage of the district that is white, the effect of Social Security 
Table 7: TP Freshman vs. All Freshmen 
Freshman TP 
Dw 
score 
Median HH 
Income 2010 
2010 
Median 
Age 
2010 Median 
Home Value 2010 UE 
% 
w/SS % White Funding 
TP 1 -.016 -.134 .085 -.182 .113 .208
*
 .066 .056 
Dw score -.016 1 .026 -.114 -.074 -.054 -.060 -.007 -.171 
Median HH Income 2010 -.134 .026 1 .201
*
 .728
**
 -.427
**
 -.382
**
 .127 .323
**
 
2010 Median Age .085 -.114 .201
*
 1 .166 -.143 .681
**
 .411
**
 .063 
2010 Median Home Value -.182 -.074 .728
**
 .166 1 -.228
*
 -.288
**
 -.247
*
 .267
**
 
2010 UE .113 -.054 -.427
**
 -.143 -.228
*
 1 .127 -.438
**
 -.268
**
 
% w/SS .208
*
 -.060 -.382
**
 .681
**
 -.288
**
 .127 1 .233
*
 -.171 
% White .066 -.007 .127 .411
**
 -.247
*
 -.438
**
 .233
*
 1 .031 
Funding .056 -.171 .323
**
 .063 .267
**
 -.268
**
 -.171 .031 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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beneficiaries remains and unemployment becomes positively correlated with Tea Party identity. 
DW-NOMINATE shows a significant, negative relationship in all models.  
Table 8: TP Freshmen vs. All Republicans 
Republicans TP Dw score % w/SS 
% 
White 
2010 
UE 
2010 
Median Age Funding 
2010 
Median 
Home Value 
Median HH 
Income 2010 
TP 1 -.283
**
 .166
**
 .008 .135
*
 .069 .042 -.130
*
 -.149
*
 
Dw score -.283
**
 1 -.199
**
 -.135
*
 -.006 -.129
*
 -.090 .149
*
 .194
**
 
% w/SS .166
**
 -.199
**
 1 .394
**
 .361
**
 .701
**
 -.111 -.328
**
 -.554
**
 
% White .008 -.135
*
 .394
**
 1 -.188
**
 .453
**
 .014 -.285
**
 -.201
**
 
2010 UE .135
*
 -.006 .361
**
 -.188
**
 1 .107 -.040 -.060 -.296
**
 
2010 Median Age .069 -.129
*
 .701
**
 .453
**
 .107 1 -.006 .071 -.004 
Funding .042 -.090 -.111 .014 -.040 -.006 1 .054 .120 
2010 Median Home 
Value 
-.130
*
 .149
*
 -.328
**
 -.285
**
 -.060 .071 .054 1 .803
**
 
Median HH Income 
2010 
-.149
*
 .194
**
 -.554
**
 -.201
**
 -.296
**
 -.004 .120 .803
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).         
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
     
 When broadening the measure of Tea Party candidates to all members of the Tea Party 
Caucus (which increases the sample size to 60 rather than 16) and comparing them with all 
members of Congress, a logit analysis, again controlling for DW-NOMINATE in the 111
th
 
Congress, percent of the district population that is white, level of campaign contributions, and 
population growth, DW-NOMINATE score is always positively significant. The percentage of a 
district receiving Social Security, level of funding, percentage white, and 2010 level of 
unemployment do not significantly affect the probability that a district will elect a member of the 
Tea Party Caucus. Median home value is negative and significant. Change in median home value 
and median household income are not significant. When comparing the Caucus members of 
other Republicans, none of the variables are significant, though the 2010 median household 
income is on the border of significance.   
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Moving into the results for the interaction of these economic and social factors and being 
a Tea Party freshman on the margin of victory shows that the interaction terms are not significant 
in any of the models. Being a freshman member of the Tea Party Caucus, however, does 
decrease the margin of victory, but not consistently. When taken in a model with the percentage 
of the population receiving Social Security, the 2010 level of unemployment, median age, and 
median home value, the effect of being a Tea Party freshman is not significant. In this model, the 
DW-NOMINATE score for the previous member of Congress has a positive, significant effect 
on the margin of victory, though it is a small effect. Median age has a significant, negative effect 
on margin of victory. The level of unemployment in 2010 has a significant positive effect on 
margin of victory, though it is a small effect. The level of campaign contributions and percentage 
of the population receiving Social Security in a district also have small, negative but significant 
effects on margin of victory. 
Discussion 
 The only factor which shows up across all groups against which freshmen members of 
the Tea Party Caucus are compared is the percentage of Social Security beneficiaries in a district. 
This is interesting for a couple of reasons. As measured by a variety of factors, the Tea Party is 
strongly antigovernment which includes government-funded programs. Skocpol and Williamson 
note an interesting distinction about which programs this actually applies to. They specifically 
mention different attitudes towards Social Security, which Tea Partiers are more likely to view as 
being a return on an investment or system which they paid into over the years (Skocpol and 
Williamson 2012). 
 Social Security beneficiaries are also facing a unique situation. Beneficiaries are older 
(which is evident from the bivariate correlations) but they also would be more likely to be retired 
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and facing a fixed income or be in a situation in which their Social Security benefits would be a 
large portion of their total income. The uncertain economy included high unemployment and a 
volatile stock market in which some might also have seen high losses in investment portfolios 
and private retirement accounts. With the high unemployment rate, Social Security recipients 
would have been facing a dismal job market had they chosen to look for work to supplement 
their benefits.  
 With these economic constraints in the background, Congress and the President were 
negotiating emergency economic policy measures, which led to massive spending and a 
subsequent conversation on government debt. This was a major concern of the Tea Party (Saad, 
2010) at a time when “entitlement spending” (along with tax rates) was the major bone of 
contention between Congressional Republicans and Democrats. Social Security benefits were 
typically not among the cuts proposed, but the general situation likely created an environment of 
uncertainty and protectionism towards the voters’ own benefits. In this case, that seems to have 
translated into an increased probability of electing a Tea Party member, relative to any other 
group. This may have been both an expression of policy preferences and an attempt to influence 
policy-making decision in Congress and dissatisfaction with the current economic situation. 
  The other economic indicators, while not consistent across the groups in terms of the 
significance of their effects, nevertheless point to some voting based on economic conditions. 
Taken together, the general effect of the individual variables suggests that a worsening of 
economic conditions in a district led to increased likelihood of electing a Tea Party freshman. 
While this is consistent with a theory of negative economic conditions leading to political 
extremism, it is actually the opposite of what polling data suggests about the overall 
characteristics of Tea Party supporters. While Tea Party supporters are typically wealthier than 
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the average voter, median household income decreases the likelihood of electing a Tea Party 
freshman.  
 To the extent that Tea Party Members of Congress voted with Republicans and the 
demographics of the supporters of both the Tea Party and the Republican Party overlap 
significantly, the results of comparing Tea Party freshman against all Republicans in the House 
of Representatives becomes particularly interesting. When controlling for a variety of factors, 
unemployment rate in the 2010 district becomes important, with a higher rate increasing the 
likelihood of electing a Tea Party member. The effect of income and home value, however, 
largely goes away.  
These results suggest that economic factors did play a role for the freshmen members of 
the Tea Party Caucus, even among districts that elected Republicans, the non-incumbent party. 
Median income and home value are highly correlated and the polling data suggests that the 
supporters of the Tea Party overlap with Republicans in that their median income is higher than 
average. Polls do not tell us about unemployment. In this case, given the overlap of the other two 
variables with each other and with Tea Party supporters and all Republicans, unemployment may 
be a better measure of the difference in the overall economic conditions between Tea Party 
districts and all Republican districts.  
Ideology also becomes significant (with a stronger effect when measured against 
Republicans as opposed to all Members of Congress). The sign is negative (with ideology being 
measured on a scale in which larger numbers (positive) are more conservative and lower 
numbers (negative) are more liberal), so that districts whose representatives were more liberal 
(compared to other districts represented by a Republican) were more likely to elect a freshman 
Tea Party member. This may suggest that representatives who had moved to the center (maybe 
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too far from the median voter in a district) were more vulnerable, easier targets for Tea Party 
challenges. From the qualitative review of the districts and the 2010 races, it appears not to be a 
factor of the sweeping 2008 Democratic victories, as some districts replaced Democrat members 
who had been in office for many years.  
 Campaign contributions in this model are not significant. The qualitative data again 
shows that funding varied widely by district. It should be noted that this analysis does not 
measure funding ratios between candidates. Nor does it include variables such as which groups 
were important funders such as the Club for Growth or National Republican Congressional 
Committee. Ideology does not affect the likelihood of electing a Tea Party member when 
compared to other freshmen. This finding is consistent with other research indicating a strong 
anti-incumbent sentiment in 2010.  
The model with interaction terms shows that the economic and social factors taken 
together with being a Tea Party freshman did not have any significant effect on margin of 
victory. Being a Tea Party freshman can decrease the margin of victory. Taken with the effect of 
the DW-NOMINATE scores of the 111
th
 Congress that appears in the results above suggests that 
this may be a result of which races the Tea Party members targeted. Some of these districts 
included incumbent candidates which were weaker than others and would have seen closer races, 
the effect on campaign contributions supports this. Higher levels of contributions decrease the 
margin of victory which is likely because funding tends to be higher in more competitive races 
where it will have a larger effect on the outcome.  In this model, the DW-NOMINATE score 
does have a positive effect on margin of victory, which is the expected ideological relationship. 
This implies that candidates in districts which had a more conservative member of Congress 
previously would have a higher margin of victory. This applies for all candidates, not just Tea 
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Party freshmen. This is consistent with the anti-incumbent sentiment and previous models which 
suggest the incumbent party does not do well in elections when the economy is poor and the 
advantage Republicans had in 2010.  
The analysis of the whole Tea Party Caucus is consistent with more conservative voters 
supporting the Tea Party movement. The DW-NOMINATE score is consistently positive here 
which suggests that districts with more conservative members prior to 2010 and compared to all 
members of Congress were more likely to elect a candidate who would join the Tea Party 
Caucus. This implies that these members of the Caucus are more conservative than other 
members of Congress. This relationship does not hold when comparing the Caucus to other 
Republicans, suggesting that ideology was not a significant reason why members elected in 2010 
joined the Caucus. When comparing the Caucus members to other Republicans, the results 
suggest that Caucus members were fairly similar to other Republicans. This is consistent with 
previous research. 
Conclusion 
 The data on the 16 congressional districts which elected freshman members of the House 
Tea Party Caucus in 2010 do not, on the surface, seem to show certain unifying characteristics 
among them that distinguish those districts from the economic trends across the country. Using 
quantitative analysis yields results which point to the significance of the percentage of Social 
Security recipients in a district and, for Republican Members of Congress, the extent to which 
representatives were more liberal than other Republicans. This provides support for the theory 
that worsening economic conditions led to an increase in the success of Tea Party candidates. 
When extended to all members of the Tea Party Caucus, results are not conclusive as to why 
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districts elected these candidates as opposed to other Republicans. This analysis includes 
incumbents and may be affected by the incumbency advantage they would have enjoyed.  
 This evidence is consistent with the research that suggests poor economic performance 
leads to political extremism and losses for the incumbent party. The 2010 midterm election cycle 
was particularly unique in that it came after a major political event in 2008 (the election of the 
first African-American President and historic policy objectives in the Affordable Care Act and 
economic stimulus) and a major economic crisis. The midterm elections happened as a variety of 
forces were coming together which created a perfect storm for a political movement. Without the 
policy advances, the sweeping Democratic victories in 2008, or the economic crisis, the Tea 
Party’s message may have fallen on deaf ears.  
 The conditions in 2010 did help Tea Party freshmen candidates, but this can be attributed 
to their identity as freshmen and Republicans more so than their alliance with the Tea Party. This 
paper only examines Tea Party freshmen in 2010. Future research should examine the effect of 
improving economic conditions and how that affected the performance of Tea Party 
representatives in 2012. It should also expand the definition of “Tea Party” to look at the effects 
of economic conditions on Tea Party activism, endorsements, and the emergence of a Tea Party 
candidate in congressional districts.  
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Tea Party Measured against all Members of Congress  
 
Table 9 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.673 .338 3.950 1 .047 .510 
ZFunding .273 .202 1.829 1 .176 1.314 
ZRatio106Population .719 .280 6.569 1 .010 2.052 
ZWhite .522 .416 1.573 1 .210 1.685 
ZwSS .874 .270 10.485 1 .001 2.398 
Constant -3.949 .411 92.354 1 .000 .019 
 
Table 10 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.554 .304 3.310 1 .069 .575 
ZFunding .180 .179 1.009 1 .315 1.197 
ZRatio106Population .593 .267 4.951 1 .026 1.810 
ZWhite 1.383 .503 7.565 1 .006 3.988 
Z@2010UE .742 .340 4.773 1 .029 2.101 
Constant -3.840 .406 89.625 1 .000 .021 
 
Table 11 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.502 .318 2.481 1 .115 .606 
ZFunding .289 .186 2.402 1 .121 1.335 
ZRatio106Population .515 .270 3.646 1 .056 1.674 
ZWhite .872 .377 5.348 1 .021 2.392 
ZMedianHHIncome2010 -1.049 .467 5.054 1 .025 .350 
Constant -3.947 .430 84.336 1 .000 .019 
 
 Table 12 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.652 .326 4.003 1 .045 .521 
ZFunding .252 .180 1.943 1 .163 1.286 
ZRatio106Population .546 .264 4.268 1 .039 1.726 
ZWhite .690 .386 3.199 1 .074 1.994 
Z@2010MedianHomeValue -2.087 .864 5.830 1 .016 .124 
Constant -4.489 .637 49.661 1 .000 .011 
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Table 13 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.530 .299 3.153 1 .076 .588 
ZFunding .141 .186 .576 1 .448 1.151 
ZRatio106Population .574 .285 4.051 1 .044 1.776 
ZWhite .973 .434 5.033 1 .025 2.646 
ZMedianHHChange -.174 .284 .378 1 .539 .840 
Constant -3.670 .365 101.342 1 .000 .025 
 
Table 14 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.520 .299 3.020 1 .082 .594 
ZFunding .144 .186 .596 1 .440 1.154 
ZRatio106Population .539 .280 3.697 1 .055 1.714 
ZWhite .976 .448 4.749 1 .029 2.652 
ZHomeValueChange -.068 .265 .066 1 .797 .934 
Constant -3.659 .363 101.454 1 .000 .026 
 
Tea Party Measured against all Freshmen 
 
Table 15 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.107 .422 .065 1 .799 .898 
ZFunding .367 .338 1.177 1 .278 1.443 
ZRatio106Population .468 .302 2.397 1 .122 1.596 
ZWhite .200 .415 .231 1 .631 1.221 
ZwSS .766 .363 4.452 1 .035 2.152 
Constant -2.289 .454 25.437 1 .000 .101 
 
Table 16 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.084 .394 .046 1 .830 .919 
ZFunding .367 .335 1.199 1 .274 1.443 
ZRatio106Population .464 .265 3.064 1 .080 1.590 
ZWhite .883 .519 2.891 1 .089 2.417 
Z@2010UE .887 .423 4.404 1 .036 2.429 
Constant -2.116 .424 24.969 1 .000 .120 
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Table 17 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.047 .398 .014 1 .906 .954 
ZFunding .380 .341 1.244 1 .265 1.463 
ZRatio106Population .328 .282 1.357 1 .244 1.388 
ZWhite .417 .412 1.028 1 .311 1.518 
ZMedianHHIncome2010 -.795 .533 2.221 1 .136 .452 
Constant -2.208 .470 22.055 1 .000 .110 
 
Table 18 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.066 .403 .027 1 .870 .936 
ZFunding .496 .365 1.841 1 .175 1.642 
ZRatio106Population .365 .286 1.636 1 .201 1.441 
ZWhite .265 .421 .398 1 .528 1.304 
Z@2010MedianHomeValue -2.024 1.057 3.666 1 .056 .132 
Constant -2.888 .755 14.643 1 .000 .056 
 
Table 19 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.087 .396 .048 1 .827 .917 
ZFunding .220 .329 .447 1 .504 1.247 
ZRatio106Population .390 .288 1.833 1 .176 1.477 
ZWhite .366 .429 .729 1 .393 1.442 
ZMedianHHChange .132 .375 .125 1 .724 1.142 
Constant -1.869 .379 24.290 1 .000 .154 
 
Table 20 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -.118 .391 .091 1 .763 .889 
ZFunding .190 .325 .343 1 .558 1.209 
ZRatio106Population .386 .279 1.907 1 .167 1.471 
ZWhite .375 .428 .767 1 .381 1.454 
ZHomeValueChange -.061 .313 .038 1 .845 .941 
Constant -1.867 .378 24.332 1 .000 .155 
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Tea Party Measured against all Republicans 
 
Table 21 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -1.459 .386 14.248 1 .000 .233 
ZFunding .231 .254 .831 1 .362 1.260 
ZRatio106Population .562 .314 3.211 1 .073 1.755 
ZWhite -.525 .568 .855 1 .355 .591 
ZwSS .860 .314 7.491 1 .006 2.364 
Constant -2.625 .463 32.131 1 .000 .072 
 
Table 22 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -1.436 .364 15.551 1 .000 .238 
ZFunding .142 .239 .352 1 .553 1.152 
ZRatio106Population .385 .305 1.585 1 .208 1.469 
ZWhite .240 .594 .164 1 .686 1.272 
Z@2010UE .878 .408 4.640 1 .031 2.406 
Constant -2.394 .441 29.409 1 .000 .091 
 
Table 23 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -1.288 .369 12.208 1 .000 .276 
ZFunding .212 .248 .734 1 .392 1.236 
ZRatio106Population .381 .314 1.470 1 .225 1.464 
ZWhite -.178 .516 .119 1 .730 .837 
ZMedianHHIncome2010 -.909 .509 3.186 1 .074 .403 
Constant -2.560 .480 28.391 1 .000 .077 
 
Table 24 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -1.349 .364 13.743 1 .000 .259 
ZFunding .211 .232 .826 1 .363 1.235 
ZRatio106Population .383 .310 1.531 1 .216 1.467 
ZWhite -.275 .522 .277 1 .598 .760 
Z@2010MedianHomeValue -2.004 1.056 3.603 1 .058 .135 
Constant -3.220 .751 18.385 1 .000 .040 
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Table 25 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -1.426 .366 15.221 1 .000 .240 
ZFunding .085 .256 .112 1 .738 1.089 
ZRatio106Population .385 .307 1.579 1 .209 1.470 
ZWhite -.135 .544 .062 1 .804 .874 
ZMedianHHChange -.041 .277 .022 1 .882 .960 
Constant -2.264 .403 31.526 1 .000 .104 
 
Table 26 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th -1.440 .366 15.452 1 .000 .237 
ZFunding .073 .259 .080 1 .777 1.076 
ZRatio106Population .377 .299 1.594 1 .207 1.458 
ZWhite -.136 .544 .062 1 .803 .873 
ZHomeValueChange -.136 .286 .225 1 .635 .873 
Constant -2.232 .403 30.662 1 .000 .107 
 
Tea Party Caucus Members versus all Members of Congress 
 
Table 27 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th 1.003 .186 29.016 1 .000 2.726 
ZFunding .121 .119 1.033 1 .310 1.129 
ZRatio106Population .280 .154 3.329 1 .068 1.323 
ZWhite .166 .241 .475 1 .491 1.181 
ZwSS .128 .163 .614 1 .433 1.136 
Constant -2.323 .207 125.896 1 .000 .098 
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Table 28 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .986 .184 28.765 1 .000 2.681 
ZFunding .106 .119 .795 1 .373 1.112 
ZRatio106Population .258 .152 2.869 1 .090 1.294 
ZWhite .192 .235 .668 1 .414 1.212 
Z@2010UE -.133 .190 .488 1 .485 .876 
Constant -2.327 .208 124.938 1 .000 .098 
 
Table 29 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th 1.053 .192 30.102 1 .000 2.867 
ZFunding .144 .121 1.409 1 .235 1.155 
ZRatio106Population .242 .151 2.560 1 .110 1.273 
ZWhite .174 .223 .607 1 .436 1.190 
ZMedianHHIncome2010 -.315 .186 2.882 1 .090 .730 
Constant -2.341 .208 126.061 1 .000 .096 
 
Table 24 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th 1.012 .191 27.962 1 .000 2.751 
ZFunding .132 .121 1.202 1 .273 1.141 
ZRatio106Population .212 .151 1.960 1 .162 1.236 
ZWhite .061 .231 .070 1 .792 1.063 
Z@2010MedianHomeValue -.600 .274 4.816 1 .028 .549 
Constant -2.422 .225 116.041 1 .000 .089 
 
Table 25 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th 1.008 .186 29.310 1 .000 2.740 
ZFunding .113 .119 .904 1 .342 1.120 
ZRatio106Population .222 .163 1.858 1 .173 1.249 
ZWhite .225 .228 .978 1 .323 1.252 
ZMedianHHChange .110 .151 .529 1 .467 1.116 
Constant -2.316 .206 126.593 1 .000 .099 
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Table 26 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th 1.023 .187 29.892 1 .000 2.782 
ZFunding .128 .120 1.139 1 .286 1.136 
ZRatio106Population .177 .163 1.176 1 .278 1.193 
ZWhite .158 .226 .491 1 .483 1.172 
ZHomeValueChange .298 .165 3.278 1 .070 1.347 
Constant -2.341 .208 126.447 1 .000 .096 
Tea Party Caucus Members versus all Republicans 
Table 27 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .328 .210 2.441 1 .118 1.388 
ZFunding .109 .119 .838 1 .360 1.115 
ZRatio106Population .235 .164 2.061 1 .151 1.265 
ZWhite -.353 .302 1.360 1 .243 .703 
ZwSS .102 .171 .360 1 .549 1.108 
Constant -1.293 .263 24.201 1 .000 .275 
 
Table 28 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .304 .207 2.152 1 .142 1.355 
ZFunding .094 .117 .647 1 .421 1.099 
ZRatio106Population .218 .160 1.841 1 .175 1.243 
ZWhite -.321 .288 1.242 1 .265 .726 
Z@2010UE -.121 .199 .373 1 .541 .886 
Constant -1.294 .263 24.132 1 .000 .274 
 
Table 29 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .390 .214 3.330 1 .068 1.477 
ZFunding .129 .119 1.187 1 .276 1.138 
ZRatio106Population .195 .163 1.432 1 .232 1.215 
ZWhite -.395 .287 1.896 1 .168 .674 
ZMedianHHIncome2010 -.334 .195 2.933 1 .087 .716 
Constant -1.304 .263 24.499 1 .000 .272 
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Table 30 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .376 .212 3.153 1 .076 1.456 
ZFunding .114 .118 .938 1 .333 1.121 
ZRatio106Population .163 .163 .999 1 .318 1.177 
ZWhite -.463 .293 2.488 1 .115 .630 
Z@2010MedianHomeValue -.552 .290 3.622 1 .057 .576 
Constant -1.417 .278 25.896 1 .000 .242 
 
Table 31 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .318 .208 2.341 1 .126 1.375 
ZFunding .102 .117 .754 1 .385 1.107 
ZRatio106Population .169 .174 .946 1 .331 1.184 
ZWhite -.300 .283 1.123 1 .289 .741 
ZMedianHHChange .128 .156 .672 1 .412 1.137 
Constant -1.271 .262 23.453 1 .000 .281 
 
Table 32 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 
ZDWScore111th .349 .210 2.766 1 .096 1.417 
ZFunding .114 .118 .943 1 .332 1.121 
ZRatio106Population .151 .171 .775 1 .379 1.163 
ZWhite -.347 .283 1.505 1 .220 .707 
ZHomeValueChange .281 .166 2.878 1 .090 1.325 
Constant -1.323 .264 25.190 1 .000 .266 
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Tea Party Freshmen Margin of Victory 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 55.271 5.650  9.783 .000 
TP -65.296 35.833 -.548 -1.822 .069 
TPfroshSS 1.645 1.079 .460 1.525 .128 
% w/SS -.842 .197 -.206 -4.279 .000 
 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 40.420 1.795  22.516 .000 
TP -22.601 8.705 -.190 -2.596 .010 
TPfroshFund 5.256E-006 .000 .098 1.319 .188 
Funding -6.056E-006 .000 -.289 -6.096 .000 
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Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 17.076 4.030  4.238 .000 
TP 12.911 26.477 .108 .488 .626 
TPfroshUE -2.513 2.277 -.245 -1.104 .270 
2010 UE 1.323 .355 .177 3.723 .000 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 96.130 11.690  8.224 .000 
TP -109.437 60.508 -.918 -1.809 .071 
TPfroshAge 2.496 1.552 .817 1.608 .109 
2010 Median Age -1.731 .312 -.262 -5.548 .000 
 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 28.392 2.122  13.381 .000 
TP -.577 20.180 -.005 -.029 .977 
TPfroshHomeValue -9.042E-005 .000 -.117 -.691 .490 
2010 Median Home Value 1.344E-005 .000 .083 1.726 .085 
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Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 30.864 1.075  28.701 .000 
TP -14.221 5.557 -.119 -2.559 .011 
TPfroshDW111 12.864 14.745 .041 .872 .383 
Dw score 9.185 2.036 .212 4.512 .000 
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